Federal regulators decided not to open an inquiry on the ignitions of Chevrolet Cobalts and other cars even after their own investigators reported in 2007 that they knew of four fatal crashes, 29 complaints and 14 other reports that showed the problem disabled air bags, according to a memo released by a House subcommittee on Sunday.þþThen in 2010, the safety agency came to the same decision after receiving more reports that air bags were not deploying. þþThe memo also revealed that General Motors approved the faulty design of the switch in 2002 even though the company that made the part, Delphi, warned the automaker that the switch did not meet specifications. This followed a warning the year before — when the Saturn Ion was being developed — but G.M. said that “a design change had solved the problem,” according to the memo.þþThe striking new details in the memo bolster the contention that both G.M. and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, more than previously acknowledged, ignored or dismissed warnings for more than a decade about a faulty ignition switch that, if bumped, could turn off, shutting the engine and disabling the air bags. General Motors has recalled nearly 2.6 million cars and has linked 13 deaths to the defect.þþLate Sunday, the safety agency said in a statement, “As we have stated previously, the agency reviewed data from a number of sources in 2007, but the data we had available at the time did not warrant a formal investigation.”þþIn a statement, General Motors said, “We deeply regret the events that led to the recall. We are fully cooperating with N.H.T.S.A. and the Congress and we welcome the opportunity to help both have a full understanding of the facts.” Company officials have promised fuller responses at the hearing.þþA House subcommittee, which gathered more than 200,000 pages of documents from G.M. and 6,000 pages from the agency, will hold a hearing on Tuesday. Mary T. Barra, General Motors’ chief executive, and David Friedman, the acting administrator of the safety agency, are scheduled to testify. Both are also scheduled to testify before a Senate panel on Wednesday.þþ“The problems persisted over a decade, the red flags were many, and yet those responsible failed to connect the dots,” Fred Upton, a Republican of Michigan and the chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, said in a statement.þþThe most damaging finding in the memo concerned the four fatal crashes that went unheeded by regulators.þþIn a presentation dated Nov. 17, 2007, the safety agency’s investigators reported to its Office of Defects Investigation on the fatal crashes, as well as broad range of complaints and other reports about cars shutting off.þþ“The panel did not identify any discernible trend and decided not to pursue a more formal investigation,” the House memo said.The findings reinforce an analysis by The New York Times published March 8 that found the agency had received more than 260 complaints about Cobalts, Ions and other cars in the recall, citing potentially dangerous shutdowns. þþOn Friday, the recall was expanded to nearly 2.6 million cars, to cover vehicles that might have been repaired with defective switches.þþThe Times reviewed almost 8,000 complaints about the recalled models to look for examples when drivers may have been affected by a faulty ignition.þþThe safety agency, however, consistently responded that there was not enough evidence to warrant a safety investigation. In a statement in early March, agency officials said they used “a number of tools and techniques to gather and analyze data and look for trends that warrant a vehicle safety investigation and possibly a recall.”þþBut the safety agency has often opened investigations based on far less information.þþIn 2012, for example, it opened an investigation into air bag problems on some Hyundai models based on one complaint from an owner whose ear was slightly cut when an air bag deployed. That led to the recall last year of 190,000 vehicles.þþThe memo also described more clearly the factors that G.M. used in deciding not to recall the cars.þþIn March 2005, for example, after considering a number of fixes to the problem, engineers determined that “none of the solutions represents an acceptable business case.” But the memo notes that none of the documents explain the criteria for what would have prompted to G.M. to initiate a recall.þþLater that year, a division of the company identified as “Brand Quality” noticed a higher level of buybacks of the cars — meaning owners who turned them in under lemon laws or for other reasons — and urged that “the issue be reopened,” according to the memo. þþA fix was again proposed, this time by changing the key ring slot to a hole and using a smaller ring. But again, G.M. declined to make the fix.þþ“G.M. acknowledges that this proposal was approved, but later canceled,” the memo said.þþThe chairman of the Oversight and Investigations subcommittee, Tim Murphy, Republican of Pennsylvania, who will lead Tuesday’s hearing, said in a statement that G.M. and the safety agency had produced documents by the boxful so far in response to extensive requests from the committee.þþ“Although we have had the documents for less than a week,” he said, “they paint an unsettling picture.”þþNeither of the two people scheduled to testify, Ms. Barra and Mr. Friedman, were in their jobs during most of the period in question, so the testimony might not establish how the critical decisions were made — or not made, as seems to be the case.þþLike the two timelines that G.M. has previously submitted to the N.H.T.S.A., the committee’s prehearing report gives dates, but not names; it has not released the supporting documents.þþ
Source: NY Times
